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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R. JERRY FIVAS and ALAIRE J.
FIVAS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Civil No. 8470

JOSEPH F. PETERSEN and
FLORENCE E. PETERSEN,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment in a suit to quiet
title wherein the plaintiffs relied upon a sale for taxes
for the year 1949 and particularly upon an auditor's tax
deed issued after the ~fay sale in 1954. At the ti1ne of
trial the plaintiffs introduced in evidence the original
auditor's deed (Ex. 1) and a copy of the tax sale record
certified by the official custodian of the record at thA
time of the certificate under the seal of his office, (Ex.
2) making a prima facie case pursuant to Section 59-1036, U.C.A. 1953.
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The burden then shifted to the defendants, who had
filed an Answer generally denying title in the plaintiffs,
to prove the title in the plaintiffs as derived from the tax
sale as defective and invalid. The defendants introduced
no evidence, and it was stipulated that all answers to
interrogatories .and requests for admissions of fact as
filed by both parties should be admitted. Judgment was
given by the trial court in favor of plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
On the record as made in the trial court the defendants in the trial court, as now on .appeal, argued for invalidity of the tax sale on the four points as set forth
in Appellants' Brief. Respondents now reply to these
arguments in the same order and present the following
points to the court for consideration:
POINT I.
FAILURE OF THE TAXPAYER TO RECEIVE TAX
NOTICES DID NOT INVALIDATE THE TAX SALE, AS
THE BURDEN IS ON THE TAXPAYER TO PROTECT HIS
PROPERTY FROM TAX SALE BY DETERMINING AND
PAYING HIS TAXES.

POINT II.
THE TAX DEED RECITES A SUFFICIENT ·CONSIDERATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (5') OF
SEC. 59-10-64, U.C.A. 1953, WHICH IS BY ITS TERMS DIRECTORY AND WHI·CH MUST BE SO CONSTRUED TO
GIVE REASON AND EFFECT TO THE OTHER PARAGRAPHS OF THE SAME SECTION.
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POINT III.
THE NOTI·CE PUBLISHED WITH THE DELINQUENT
LIST CONTAINED NO EXCESSIVE DEMAND WHICH
WOULD INVALIDATE THE SALE.

POINT IV.
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER OF TENDER HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THIS SITUATION. WAIVER OF TENDER
REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
FAILURE OF THE TAXPAYER TO RECEIVE TAX
NOTICES DID NOT INVALIDATE THE TAX SALE, AS
THE BURDEN IS ON THE ·TAXPAYER TO PROTECT HIS
PROPERTY FROM TAX SALE BY DETERMINING AND
PAYING HIS TAXES.

Appellants have argued that both the notice of valuation and the tax notice were invalid and improper as they
were not mailed by the County Treasurer and further
that the tax sale was invalidated as the County Assessor
did not have on the tax rolls any address for the taxpayer from which the treasurer could obtain his mailing
address.
Appellants relied for authority upon Jungk v.
Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168 (1904). That case involved
the validity of a tax notice on a mining claim, wherein
the notice showed the owners as "unknown", and the
notice was actually mailed to "Ophir, Unknown, Henrietta
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claim." The parties attacking the tax sale showed that
the assessor had made no attempts to locate and identify
the owners and their addresses .and that the property
was assessed in the nmne of the claim, with the notation
"owners unknown." The applicable law was Section 43
of the Revenue Act of 1896 (Sess. Laws 1896, P. 435, c.
129) which provided specifically and spelled out that the
assessor should determine so far as possible the names
of the owners and their addresses from "taxpayers'
statements, county records, or otherwise." The section
construed in the Jungk case is not in the law today
and was succeeded by Sec. 5912 R.S. 1898 and C. L. 1907
and Sec. 2610, R.S. 1898, now both carried after many
amendments into present Sections 59-10-9 and 59-10-10,
U.C.A. 1953, which generally provide for the mailing of
valuation and tax notices by the County Treasurer. By
the amendments to the old laws the entire theory of the
law of taxation has been changed with the burden being
placed upon the taxpayer instead of the county officials
to see that the taxpayer ultimately receives notices regarding his property. This is both logical and reasonable in view of the increase in population and the increase in number of separate assessed parcels of property. The time has passed when the county officials
should be expected to know personally any great number
of taxpayers or should be expected to conduct intensive
investigation to identify, locate and personally contact
taxpayers.
The change·s in the applicable law have kept pace
with the practical population changes. Section 59-10-9,
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U.C.A. 1953, now provides regarding the valuation notice
as follows:
"The county treasurer shall furnish to each
taxpayer by mail to the address noted on the assessment book, postage prepaid, or leave at his
residence or usual place of business, if known) a
notice of the kind and valuation of property assessed to him, also notice of the days fixed by
the county board of equalization for hearing complaints." (Italics ours.)
Section 59-10-10, U.C.A. 1953, provides regarding the
tax notice from the treasurer as follows:
"He shall proceed to collect taxes and shall
furnish to each taxpayer, except car companies
and the owners of automobiles, motor stages,
motor transports, and trailers employed in common-c.arrier business, by mail, postage prepaid,
or leave at his residence or usual place of business,
if known) a notice of the amount of tax assessed
against him, which shall set out the aggregate
amount of taxes to be paid, for state, county, city,
town and school purposes, etc." (Italics ours.)

.

We stress the inclusion in e.ach section of the phrase
"if known," which we submit must reasonably mean if
kno-vvn to the County Treasurer, either through personal
knowledge or sources of information available in his own
office and in regard to the property taxed.
The Washington Supreme Court in Spokane County
v. Glover) 2 Wash. 2d 162, 97 P. 2d 628 (1940), decided
that "the proceeding to assess and collect taxes upon real
property was a proceeding in rem; that the owner of
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property is chargeable with knowledge of every step in
the tax procedure; and that statutory provisions with
regard to owners are directory rather than mandatory."
The Glover case involved a que,stion as to whether the
County Treasurer should go outside his office and use
every possible means to locate taxpayers, in fact conducting a fugitive hunt for them, or whether a duty was on
the taxpayer to keep the treasurer informed as to his
whereabouts. The court stated that the policy should
reasonably be that "which charges the owner of property
with knowledge of the fact that his property is taxable
every year" and that the "legislature did not intend to
ineffectuate the entire taxing system by making the
owner's duty to pay taxes conditional upon the sending
of a notice by the treasurer." The Glover case contains a
full discussion of the difficulties that would face the
treasurer if by necessity he had the burden of locating
all taxpayers.

S1dter v. Sc1tdder, 110 niont. 390, 103 P. 2d 303, 306
(1940) gives a statement of general policy in the follo,ving language :
"It is incumbent upon a property owner to take
notice of the known fact that all property is taxed
annually, and unless the taxes are paid that the
property will be sold at tax sale," and cites 61
C.J. 565; Detroit Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, (Mich.)
199 N.W. 699; McGuire v. Bean, 151 Wash. 474,
276 P. 555.
Appellants have argued that failure to get a tax notice to the taxpayers involved ultimately taking their
property without due process.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
In Pender v. Ebey, 194 Okla. 407, 152 P. 2d 268
(1944) the court stated that:

'I

"* * * generally, every person is charged
with knowledge as to whether his taxes are paid,
and if they are not paid he is charged with knowledge that the land may be sold in the manner provided by law, and owner is charged with notice of
the time and place where such sales are required
to be made." See also N. H. Ranch Co. v. Gann,
42 N.M. 530, 82 P. 2d 632; Jones v. Mills County
(Iowa) 279 N.W. 96; Selzer v. Baker, (N.Y.) 65
N.E. 2d 752 (1945).

We submit that there can be no lack of due process
when the burden is actually on the taxpayer to protect
his property and to see that his taxes are paid.
The record in the instant case shows through the
admissions of the defendants in the negative that they
did not make any inquiry of the county assessor or county
treasurer as to why tax notices were not received, where
the tax notices were, or what the taxes amounted to. (R.
29) .. __Appellants answered in the negative Respondents'
Interrogatory No. 25 which was: "If no tax notices for
the years 1948 and subsequent years covering said property were received by you, did you ever contact Barnes
Banking Company or Horace J. Knowlton or Elsie M.
Knowlton to make inquiry regarding said tax notices
or the taxes due upon s.aid property~" (R. 22). The
record reveals that Barnes Banking Company had a mortgage upon said property, and the Knowltons were the
grantors of appellants. (R. 22, 24).
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We submit that the logic of the cases cited above,
which hold that the taxpayer is charged with knowledg~
of his property being subject to tax and with the burden
of seeing that the taxes are paid, should control. This
burden on the taxpayer necessarily imposes on him the
duty of supplying the treasurer with a current address
and of checking with the treasurer as to why any tax
notice is not received if a tax may be assumed to be due.
We submit that the present statutes, Section 59-10-9 and
Section 59-10-10, U.C.A. 1953, are a legislative pronouncement of a change of policy supporting the practical
doctrine of the Glover case, supra, and abandoning the
unworkable theory of our old statutes and the Jungk
case, supra.

POINT II.
THE TAX DEED RECITES A SUFFICIENT .CONSIDERATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 59-10-64 (5) WHICH
IS BY ITS TERMS DIRECTORY.

The appellants have referred to Section 59-10-64,
U.C.A. 1953, in arguing that the tax deed issued by the
County Auditor to the respondents on }fay 13, 1954 was
void on its face because the consideration as recited was
not that actually paid.
The statute provides in paragraph ( 5), which also
sets out the form of the deed, as follows: (italics ours)
"59-10-64. (5) The County auditor is authorized in the name of the countY to execute deeds
conveying in fee simple all property sold at said
public sale to the purchaser and to attest the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with his seal. Deeds issued by the county auditor
in pursuance of this section or of section 59-10-61
shall recite the total amount of .all the delinquent
taxes, penalties, interest and costs which were paid
in for· the execution and delivery of the deed, the
year for which the property was assessed and
sold to the county at preliminary sale, a full description of the property and the name of the
grantee, .and when executed and delivered by the
auditor shall be prima facie evidence of all pro~
ceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale and of
the conveyance of the property to the grantee in
fee simple. A copy of deeds issued by the county
auditor in pursuance of this section and section
59-10-61 shall be promptly sent to the state land
board.
The deed may be substantially in the following form:

TAX DEED
--------------------------------------------------------County, a body
corporate and (politic) of the State of Utah,
grantor, hereby conveys to ________________________________________ ,
grantee, of ---------------------------------------- the following
described real estate in _______________________________________________ _
County, Utah:
(Here describe the property conveyed)
This conveyance is made in consideration of
payment by the grantee of the sum of $---------------delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs constituting .a charge against said real estate, which
was sold to said county at preliminary sale for
nonpayment of general taxes assessed against it
for the year 19 ________ in the sum of $------------------------·
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Dated this ---------------- day of
19 ________ .

____________________________

,

County --------------------------·-----------------------

By ---------------------------------------------------------County Auditor"
According to this statute the county auditor "is authorized" to give a deed as set out .above. "Authorized"
is a word that has very generally been construed by the
courts to imply permissive use of discretion. See Creek
Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 87 L. Ed. 1046;
State v. Laven, (Wis.) 71 N.W. 2d 287.
The statute provides the form for the tax deed, and
it is specific in providing that the deed "may be subs~antially" in that form. "Substantially" is again another
word that has been construed by the courts. In People ex
rel. Darr v. Alton R. Co., (Ill.), 43 N.E. 2d 96-!, the court
held "substantially the following form" did not require
that notice of protest shou~d be in exact form as that
prescribed in a statute, but 1neant only that notice should,
in main, contain .all essential requirements of the form
prescribed. "Substantial compliance" is a compliance
in substance, not necessarily a literal, exact compliance.
lrfartien v. Porter, 681\Iont. 450, 219 P. 817.
The county auditor is required by Section 59-10-64
( 4), U.C.A. 1953, to require payment of not only the
taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the single ye.ar for
which the sale is made, but also all other taxes, penalties,
interest and costs for subsequent years which are a charge
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against the real estate being sold. A comparison of paragraph (4) of Section 59-10-64 thus requiring sale for
"an amount including all taxes assessed subsequently
to the date of the preliminary sale" and of paragraph
(5) of the s.ame section which provides the substantial
form for the tax deed and sets forth in that form provision for the one single year of the sale only, compels the
conclusion that the amount paid to the auditor must of
necessity be greater than the consideration provided to be
recited in the form.
There would appear to be no good reason in either
law or logic why the exact consideration, either the full
exact .amount of taxes, interest, costs and penalties for
the first year or the full amount of all taxes and other
items which are charged against the property, should
by necessity be included on the face of the tax deed. There
is no question but that the usual deed of conveyance
whether warranty or quitclaim, need not recite the actual
full consideration in dollars to be valid. The statute is
clearly directory and gives only a suggested form, and
failure to follow exactly that form should not prejudice
the validity of the conveyance and the entire tax s.ale
which it consummates.
In any event, Section 59-10-64 in paragraph ( 5) thereof makes the tax deed prima facie evidence of all proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale, in this instance, on January 10, 1950, .and of the conveyance of the
property itself to the grantee. See 30 A.L.R. 8 and 88
A.L.R. 264 citing cases upholding this prima facie evi-
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dence rule. The Appellants have complained that the
deed fails to show on its face the payment of interest
due on the 1949 taxes. However, the record fails to show
that as a matter of fact all interest due was not paid.
By their answers to the appellants' request for admissions
of fact, the respondents admitted that the amounts of
taxes and penalties for the years 1949 to 1953 inclusive,
together with interest to l\1ay 13, 1954 amount to a total
of $64.56 (Answer No. 6 dated December 23, 1954). (R.
9). The respondents further admitted that the amount
paid by them to the County Auditor or to the County
Treasurer or both for the tax deed was not in excess of
the sum of $64.56 (Answer No. 7 dated December 23,
1954) (R. 9). This latter answer of the respondents was
made in response to the request for admission of facts
of the appellants which requested an adlnission that the
amount paid by the respondents was in excess of the sun1
of $64.27, which figure was corrected by the respondents
in their answer to coincide with the total amount as
actually due .and as admitted in their previous answer
(Defendant's Request No. 7, dated December 16, 1954)
(R. 5).
Appellants have cited Wall v. J(aighn, 45 Utah 2-!4,
144 P. 1100, as a case in point under Section 59-10-64,
U.C.A. 1953, and quoted language from that decision.
The Wall case involved an auditor's deed which recited
facts which clearly indicated that the county itself was !l
competitive bidder at its own sale and which failed to
show an:· circu1nstances whereby the county could be a
lawful pnrchaser. This was .a case decided in 1914 which
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construed Sections 2621, 2623, and 2629, R.S. 1898, Comp.
L. 1907. Many amendments and changes have been made
in those sections since 1914, and Section 59-10-64, U.C.A.
1953, here under consideration, was not in the law in its
present form at the time of the Wall decision.
In the instant tax deed there is nothing in its recitals
which shows any irregularity in the tax sale. The statute,
Sec. 59-10-64, U.C.A. 1953, calls for a showing on the
deed of interest paid. The deed issued recited interest
paid. (Ex. 1).• The other authority cited by appellants
is Dreiling v. Colby, 170 Kan. 570, 228 P. 2d 504, wherein
the Kansas court by dicta refers to a tax deed which
failed to recite the data required by statute. The opinion
in this case is of no help in construing our statute as it
fails to show what requirement was lacking. The Kansas
statute, however, appears by comparison to be mandatory
as to its requirements regarding recitals to be contained
in the tax deed by provision that "said deed shall recite
-." (Italics ours.) Kansas G.S. 1935 79-2501.
\ Ve question the propriety of the expression "void
on its face" as used by the appellants, who are .affected
in no way by any variation in setting forth and itemizing
the actual consideration paid, including interest. The
tax debtor should not be permitted to benefit by such
harmless variation in consideration recited (where .an
intelligent adherence to two paragraphs of the same
section, namely, 59-10-64 ( 4) and (5) require a variation)
in avoiding an otherwise valid tax s.ale. We submit that
the language of Section 59-10-64 and a logical interpreta-
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tion of that statute should call for a construction of the
section as being directory only and not mandatory.

POINT III.
THE NOTI·CE PUBLISHED WITH THE DELINQUENT
LIST CONTAINED NO EXCESSIVE DEMAND WHICH
WOULD INVALIDATE THE SALE.

Appellants argue that an excessive demand was made
in the published delinquent list because of an alleged practice of the county treasurer in collecting a 25c advertising
fee between December 1st and the following January
lOth as claimed to be allowed (1) by reference thereto
on the tax notice, or (2) because of an interpretation of
the word "costs" in the delinquent list to be synonymous
with "advertising fee."
Respondents emphasize that the record of this case
will not support the conclusions of the appellants as set
forth in their Statement of Facts (App. Br. 4) that there
was any established custom and practice for the County
Treasurer to demand and collect an advertising fee in addition to the taxes and penalties. On the contrary the
record does establish that there was no policy or practice
in this regard (R. 18).
The conduct of the County Treasurer in the preparation of both the tax notice and the delinquent list was entirely in accord with statutory requiren1ents. Section
59-10-10 and Section 59-10-29, U.C.A., 1953.
Appellants rely chiefly on Fidelity Investment Co.
v. S. L. County. 119 Utah -l-19, 228 P. 2d 278. That deci-
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sion w.as li1nited to finding the 25c advertising fee invalid
during the 40 day period between December 1st and the
following January lOth. There is no question but that
after January lOth the 25c advertising fee was entirely
valid and collectable. We submit that the Fidelity decision, supra, diluted the constructive demand by the
County Treasurer in the tax notice. (We say constructive
demand here, as it could only be constructive to a taxpayer who did not receive a tax notice.)
The dmnand of the county treasurer as authorized
by statute was part of the law of which every taxp.ayer
was presumed to know and which subject thereto he held
his property. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485,
29 A.L.R. 1371; North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,
268 U.S. 276, 69 L. Ed. 953, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491. That
demand made by the County Treasurer pursuant to statute was tempered by the construction placed on it by the
Fidelity decision, supra. Case law is a part of the whole
body of the law of the land to which the presumption of
knowledge thereof applies equally with statutory law.
Spitzer v. Board of Trustees (C.C.A. Ohio), 267 F. 121,
126.
Thus the taxpayer had the benefit of the Fidelity
decision, supra, and any demand made by the County
Treasurer in the delinquent list notice, and also on the
tax notice itself, was the legal demand as required by
statute as limited by the Fidelity case. Any constructive
demand made by the County Treasurer was only that
which he legally could make, namely for an advertising
fee after January lOth.
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Appellants' alleged demand to the taxpayer is the
published delinquent list. Section 59-10-29, U.C.A 1953,
provides that the delinquent list shall show:
"«' * * the amount of the taxes due, exclusive
of penalty. The county treasurer must publish
with such list a notice that unless the delinquent
taxes, together with the penalty, are paid before
the lOth day of January, or if such date falls on
Sunday or a legal holiday, then the 11th day of
January, the real property upon which such taxes
are a lien, excepting only such property as is held
by the county under a prior preliminary tax sale,
will be sold for taxes, penalty and costs on said
date." (Italics ours.)

Appellants' .argument requires that the "costs" referred to in this section of necessity mean exclusively
the advertising fee. l\1anifestly this interpretation is not
justified, as the statute fails to separately itemize interest, which is a valid charge and which of necessity must
be included within the scope of "costs." The most serious
charge that .appellants could make against the form of
the delinquent list notice is that the term "costs" is not
precisely defined.
Section 59-10-29, U.C.A. 1953, supra, requires the
setting forth of several items, including the amount of
the original tax. \Ve respectfully submit that each of the
authorities cited by appellants on pages 17 to 20 of their
Brief are authorities concerned with the effect of incorrectly published amounts due and are not concerned
with any definition of •'costs" as included in our statute.
\Ve emphasize that the record here shows no error in
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the "amount of taxes due, exclusive of penalties" as set
forth in the instant tax notice and delinquent list notice.
There is no question raised by appellants as to the
validity of any demand made after January lOth. We
contend that the effect of the Fidelity case, supra, on the
tax notice and the delinquent list notice, together with
a reasonable and logical construction of the delinquent
notice, will not support any finding of an unlawful demand prior to January lOth.

POINT IV.
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER OF TENDER HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THIS SITUATION. WAIVER OF TENDER
REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT.

The .appellants' fourth contention is that the tax title
should fail as the County Treasurer had made an unauthorized demand upon the taxpayers, and that had the
taxpayer made a tender of the authorized amount it would
not have been accepted by the treasurer, and that such
tender is therefore waived.
Appellants' argument assumes :
(1)

An actual demand on the taxpayer.

(2) A definite policy on the part of the County
Treasurer not to accept payment of taxes without the
25c advertising fee. Each of these assumptions is unwarranted.
The appellants admitted by their answers to interrogatories that they did not receive any tax notice for
the year 1949 or for subsequent years; that they made no
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inquiry of the County officials, their grantors or the
mortgagee holding a mortgage upon the real property
as to why tax notices were not received. (See interrogatories Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 25 (R. 21-22) and .answers
thereto (R. 29, 33) ).
The only reference 1n the record to any policy or
lack of policy on the part of the County Treasurer as to
the acceptance of the payment of the taxes and penalties
without inclusion of the 25c advertising fee is admission
No. 5 of Respondents (R. 18) wherein an interview with
former county officials was reported. Those officials
recalled only one instance of such a tender and that by
Mr. Gatrell, attorney for appellants. \Ve submit that
one limited actual tender did not establish a course of
conduct or a firm policy.
Appellants then argue that if the two assumptions
of fact above made by them are true then any tender
is w.aived automatically, as it is assumed to be a useless
act.
In the Fidelity case, supra, as in Gatrell v. Salt
Co~tnty,

Lak~

Dist. Ct. No. 96625, referred to by appellants in

their brief, there was an actual tender of the mnount
owing on taxes, less the 25c advertising fee during the
forty day period. The tender w.as kept good by the paylnent into court of the amounts actually tendered. Respondents stress that in the instant case no tender was
1nade and that in fact the taxpayer by his own admissions
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did not have in mind at .any time material to this action
the necessity of paying, indeed, even the intention of inquiring into, these taxes (R. 21, 22, 29, 33).
We do not quarrel with the decision of the Fidelity
case, supra, nor do we quarrel with the fundamental general rule of law that a tender of an amount lawfully owing
will discharge the elaim, provided the obligee has manifest
a clear intention that the amount will not be accepted.
However, we submit that the law of tender and waiver
of tender as discharging an obligation must be strictly
limited to cases of intentional contractual relationship
between parties dealing with full knowledge of the material facts involved. The tendering of an obligation
and likewise the waiver of such tender is a volitional
type of activity and is not an automatic result that comes
about from unconscious activity. Here the appellants are
in effect saying that the taxpayers are prejudiced because
if they had received a demand and if they had made the
tender, the amount would not have been accepted. Where
either of these two suppositions does not in fact materialize, this argument must fail as not falling within the
doctrine of waiver of tender. We submit that it is not
enough that someone else (.and we emphasize that this
record and appellants' brief shows that no one other than
Mr. Gatrell himself had ever made such tender and been
refused) has made such tender; that this is not enough
to discharge the tax obligation of other taxp.ayers in
complete ignorance of Gatrell's completely isolated tender.
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The law seems to universally support the principle
that no waiver of tender exists where the creditor is not
given actual knowledge of the proposed tender and given
an opportunity to object. See 52 Am. Jur. 217. A tender
and a waiver of tender both presuppose actual knowledge
in the contracting parties of the demand and the futility
of the tender. If there is no knowledge of either the
tender or the futility of payment, there can be no waiver.

In Re Auerbach's Estate, 23 Utah 529, 65 P. 488,
our Supreme Court stated:
"A waiver is the relinquishment or refusal to
accept of a right. It is effective only when it is
made intentionally and with knowledge of the
circumstances."
The Auerbach case cites for its authority for this
statement Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U.S. 355, 26
L. Ed. 290.
In Reed v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 295,
61 P. 21, our Supreme Court again referred to the Bennecke case and again held that a waiver is an intentional
relinquishment of .a known right and that there n1ust be
both knowledge of the right and an intention to relinquish
it.
We quote from Dexter v. Sexton, 43 X.Y.S.171:
"Waiver is intentional, not accidental. \Yaiver
must be by one in possession of full knowledge
and with the intent to waive."
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We sub1nit that in this case any claim for support of
waiver of tender must be founded upon an accidental
or unconscious waiver of tender. In the c.ases of Mundt
v. J.llallon, 106 ~Iont. 422, 76 P. 2d 326, and Freedman v.
Fire Ins. Assn., 168 Penn. 249, it has been held that waiver
is essentially a matter of intention and cannot arise out
of acts done in ignorance. In Santina v. General American Ins. Co., 54 Nev. 127, 9 P. 2d 1000, the court held that
"knowledge is the essential element of waiver." In Jewell
c. Jewell (Maine) 24 Atl. 84, the court said: "A waiver
involves assent and is primarily an act of the understanding." (Italics ours.) In Hollander v. Heaslip, 222
Fed. 808, the court held :
''A waiver exists only where one with full
knowledge does or forbears to do something inconsistent with a right or with his intention to rely
on that right."
\Ve submit that the tender of the delinquent taxes
less the 25c advertising fee in the Fidelity case, supra,
and the Gatrell case, supra, should not be given the unreasonable effect of discharging the tax liens of all taxpayers without any conscious efforts on their parts.
We feel that to extend the holding of the Fidelity c.ase,
supra, is an unreasonable protection of the rights of a
taxpayer who has a period approximating five years before sale or after delinquency during which to pay a lawful tax on real estate by his claiming that for a period
approximating three weeks he would have paid an unlawful tax to the extent of 25 cents, h.ad it occurred to
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him to make redemption during that interval. As a practical matter the forty day period is cut in half because the
County Treasurer's office is closed to all payments for
about three weeks after November 30th for preparation
of the delinquent list.
Appellants have cited the cases of Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437, and H.O.L.C. v. Washington,
119 Utah 469, 161 P. 2d 355. These are both c.ases wher3
the creditor exercised an affirmative repudiation of the
amount actually sought to be tendered by the debtor.
These cases are not in point here where the parties who
could have made a tender by their admissions stated that
they never had any such idea or intention (R. 21, 22, 29,
33).
After January 10, 1950 and until the property was
sold at the May s.ale in 1954 a 25c charge was entirely
proper, as the Fidelity case, supra, would necessarily
infer. Appellants would give all taxpayers an opportunity to defeat every tax title by use of an obscure
technicality that existed only for a short period of the
lengthy time required to consummate the tax s.ale and
where the taxpayers admittedly had no intention of making any tender to take advantage of such technicality.
We submit this would be allowing the taxpayer to
upset and ineffectuate the entire taxing system .and would
make absolutely impossible the perfection of any marketable tax title, absent the question of limitations.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants' objections to this tax title in their 4 separate points apply largely to all tax titles. The objections
covered in their Points II, III .and IV could be objections
to every tax title in the State of Utah, and the theory
for which appellants argue in their Point I could likewise
create an objection in many tax titles besides that now
before this court.
Respondents submit that to uphold the claimed defects because of the attacks herein brought, or any of
them, is to declare the impossibility of protecting our
gener.al taxing authority's power to enforce payment of
general taxes by the methods intended. Absent questions
of limitations, the tax title purchaser would be forever
frustrated in perfecting a marketable title.
\Ve respectfully submit that the argued objections of
the appellants are at best trivial, immaterial and in no
w.ay affected appellants or their rights in the property
taxed. \V e emphasize the overriding principle that the
power of the taxing authority to function must be sustained; that the rights of the taxpayers must be fully
protected, but that as in the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Pillow v. Roberts, 13 Howard 472, 14
L. Ed. 228, 230 :

"The power of the legislature to make the
deed of a public officer prima f.acie evidence of
the regularity of the previous proceedings, cannot
be doubted. And the owner who neglects or re-
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fuses to pay his ta.xes, or redeem his land, has no
right to complain of its injustice. If he has paid
his taxes, or redeemed his land, he is, no doubt,
at liberty to prove it, and thus annul the sale. If
he has not, he has no right to complain if he suffers the legal consequences of his own neglect."
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed,
appellants to pay the costs incurred in connection with
this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES W. BELESS, JR.
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON
Attorneys for Respondents
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